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Miracles are finally defined as follows: "A miracle means really the supremacy of the spiritual forces of the world to an extraordinarily marked degree over the mere material" (p. 335). But such a definition is open to many objections. Man has supremacy over the material forces of the world, but it has been won through knowledge of their laws and confidence in their uniformity. To plead that nature and its laws are but the expression of God's will, and that therefore whatever happens because of his will as direct and active cause must be congruous with nature and in accordance with its laws, suggests again the tongue in the cheek. Is it true that power over "demons" once, and similar power over the deranged now, should be deemed spiritual power, especially in view of Mt. 7 23 and 12 27?

One lays down a book like this in a mood of hopelessness, for it makes glaringly evident the difference between the clerical and the scientific habit of mind. Dr. Headlam solemnly takes his opponents to task for their mental bias against miracles without recognizing that he is correspondingly prepossessed in their favor by his belief in revelation and the Incarnation. In fact, freedom from mental bias is quite out of the question for anybody above the level of a blockhead. The only question is whether the bias inclines towards or away from the rights of the case, or, to be specific, whether the scientific, critical attitude towards marvellous events reported to have occurred in the world of space and time is more appropriate than the clerical and ecclesiastical. What, for instance, would a scientific student think of this sentence which closes the chapter on the Virgin Birth? "From the naturalistic point of view it is really one of the least difficult of miracles; from the Christian point of view it is one of the most beautiful. It has been one of the greatest inspirations of Christian art, one of the purest influences on Christian life. The Church has *therefore* wisely retained it in its creed" (p. 299). The italics are mine.

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**LIGHT FROM THE EAST; STUDIES IN JAPANESE CONFUCIANISM.** ROBERT CORNELL ARMSTRONG, Ph.D. (University of Toronto Studies in Philosophy). Published by the Librarian. 1914. Pp. xvi, 326. \$1.50.

This book deals with a subject which deserves the attention of the world's thinkers and scholars, but which has hitherto been almost entirely neglected. This fact alone furnishes a strong reason for gratitude to the present book. The author tells us that the motive

which induced him to take up this subject was a desire to understand the Japanese through acquaintance with the sources of their moral training and ethical thought. This admirable intention of the author, added to the intrinsic interest—and, it is fair to say, the difficulty—of the subject, gives the work every claim to our respect.

There is perhaps no need of saying what an important rôle Confucianism played in moulding the moral life and ideas of the peoples of the Far East. Its founder, or rather systematizer, Confucius, was a practical thinker and powerful teacher—I do not wholly agree with the impression given by Dr. Armstrong that Confucius had almost nothing of metaphysics. The ethical teachings of Confucianism had two characteristics: one being the close connection of ethics with the cosmological theories of the Chinese, which leads to emphasizing the ultimate unity of human life with the “way of Heaven”; and the other the union of ethics and politics, the result of which is shown in the prominence given to civic virtues. In the course of time the Confucian system of ethics was developed in various ways, the most significant being that a certain discontinuity existing between its metaphysics, or cosmology, and its practical ethics was filled up by psychological theories. This was done chiefly by the Confucianists of the twelfth century, under the reign of the glorious Sung dynasty. The aim of these psychological studies was to furnish material for a mental discipline, through which the “cosmic reason” was brought closer to human life and metaphysical truths were incorporated in morality.

It was this modified Confucianism that was adopted by the Dictatorial government of Japan established early in the seventeenth century, and that was destined to rule the moral life of the Samurai, the rulers and fighters. This authorized system of Confucian ethics was based on the teachings of Chu-hi, known in Japan as Shu-shi. The system of Shu-shi is eminent in its emphasis on the virtue of obedience; its philosophy is a statical view of the world, and its moral teachings easily ran to an extreme of inactive sobriety, and even to something verging on hypocrisy. Naturally this system served well the purpose of the government to keep peace and order, but it did not equally satisfy those active minds which demanded initiative and originality. Some of those discontented souls derived inspiration from Wan-Yangming (known as Wō-Yōmei in Japan), an idealistic philosopher of the sixteenth century. His view was dynamic and his method intuitive, and his followers in Japan propounded a system of idealistic thought, and practised its

ethics in a vigorous life of activity made possible by invigorating mental exercises in spiritual introspection. Besides this school of Yōmei, there were various thinkers advocating principles at variance with the static ideas and quietistic influence of the orthodox Shu-shi school.

The interests of these thinkers and their points of view are manifold; their theories, metaphysical, psychological, and ethical, are important; their personalities and lives are in some cases highly interesting. These matters are treated at length in the volume before us. But there is another point of no less importance and scientific interest; namely, the influence of the time upon the thinkers, and the reaction, on the part of some of them, against the stagnant conservatism of the peaceful centuries in which they lived. This is the sociological point of view concerning these Japanese Confucianists, and it is essential to take it into account in considering their teachings and lives. I cannot enter into discussion of these aspects of the problem, but I say this because the present volume singularly misses this vital consideration. These Confucianists wrote in various styles, both in Chinese and Japanese; and to overcome the linguistic difficulties alone is a great task. Moreover, the conceptions in philosophy, psychology, and ethics which are expressed in their writings are often very different from Western conceptions, and in many cases not sharply defined. Intellectual ideas are associated with emotional terms, ethical reflections are connected with the social and political conditions of the time. Full recognition must be accorded to the author's attempt to master these conceptions, but it remains a question whether he has really mastered them. In fact, there are not a few cases, as we shall see presently, in which he has not been cautious enough in identifying Western conceptions with Confucian terms. Yet such is the difficulty of pioneer work in this untrodden field of research, that credit must be given to the author for the measure of success he has achieved.

An examination of the book shows that the main part of it, Parts II-IV, is a translation in abstract of the three books by Professor Inouye, which the author cites among his authorities on page xii, and to which he acknowledges his indebtedness in occasional passages. I compared the text throughout, and was able to identify the whole main part with its sources almost page by page. The author cites Professor Inouye's opinions in a few passages, referring to him by name; but almost everywhere else the opinions expressed, as well as quotations from the original authors, are Inouye's. The author faithfully follows Inouye, even in citing the Upanishads

side by side with the Johannine Gospel, in analogy to Tōju's ideas (p. 136). On the other hand, the author reproduces passages, greatly abridging the original. On page 148, for instance, the author cites Banzan's views on Christianity; and there he omits the last part of Banzan's opinion which says: "In case the true Confucianism shall decline and Buddhism be vanquished, the country will be conquered by the 'Kirishitans' (Christians). Then both Shinto and Confucianism will be broken down and the people will become beasts and the Imperial Throne will be destroyed" (Inouye, *Yōmei Gakuha*, p. 237). Omitting, or overlooking, this passage, the meaning of which is clear, the author interprets Banzan as if he had appreciated the superiority of Christianity, and (contrasting this with an unfavorable judgment of Christianity by the same Banzan) says: "But later he seems to have learned more about Christianity" (p. 148). This is one of the instances in which Dr. Armstrong has misinterpreted his texts by abridging them in a way not just to the originals.

The author's treatment of his sources places the reviewer in a very peculiar and puzzling position, as to which—Inouye's original or Armstrong's reproduction—should be the object of this review. The original author, Inouye, is responsible for the general arrangement and the materials selected; but the author of the present book is responsible for the condensed translation and for the expression of certain opinions concerning the Japanese Confucianists. I cannot review the book otherwise than by taking both things into account and quoting Professor Inouye's three volumes as the "original."

Taking this stand, the first point is, Why did not Dr. Armstrong so rearrange the original as to give a general view of the whole subject and adapt it to Western readers? Inouye's original presupposes knowledge, on the part of Japanese readers, of Confucian ethics at large, of the special points in Shu-shi and Ō-Yōmei, and of the general social conditions of the times. But when the matter is reproduced for English readers, the author cannot start with such presuppositions; and ought, therefore, to have treated the subject with a definite perspective. He should have brought the important figures into greater prominence than is done in the original, and have omitted many minor details and persons. To take one instance, the original gives the villages where the philosophers were born, or the amount of rice they received as emoluments from their feudal lords. These particulars may be interesting to Japanese readers, but of what concern are they to Western readers? Things

essential and characteristic should be mentioned, which serve to illustrate the personalities of those Confucianists; but the author rather confuses the impression by reproducing in minute dependence on the originals these and other insignificant details. More important, however, is the fact that the author follows the originals in copious quotations—though much abridged—which are full of repetitions. The result is that the main threads are often lost, at least to the sight of Western readers. I wish that the author had been at pains so to remodel the original that the sayings of the leaders should have been quoted in full—of course in an elucidating manner—and some minor figures and the repetitions omitted. In this way, and in this way alone, perspective and coherence could have been kept, for the sake of Western readers, for whom a clear perspective is infinitely more needed than for Japanese readers. In short, the author has not been judicious in selecting his materials, nor sufficiently careful in quoting the original sayings.

So far concerning the external form. When we come to the contents of the work, we notice a grave defect in the author's treatment; viz., that he has not observed a proper proportion between the metaphysical theories and their consequences or supplements. The author pays much attention to the metaphysical or cosmological theories of *Li* (*Ri*) and *Ch'i* (*Ki*), etc., but peculiarly neglects the psychological theories, and their relations to the mental culture or spiritual exercise which was regarded as the essential condition of ethical training in all these schools of Japanese Confucianism. Not only as regards Japanese Confucianists, but concerning Shu-shi himself, the author fails to notice their psychology, as is especially evident in his concluding chapter (pp. 299–306). This defect has an important bearing, because it was in this point that Shu-shi and other Chinese philosophers were influenced by Buddhism, and here also that Japanese Confucianism developed a characteristic trait of its ethics in uniting moral life with spiritual exercise. Of course, this cannot be overlooked; but the author touches only slightly on this vital point, and evidently does not sufficiently recognize the importance of this feature in the later Confucianists.

The neglect of this point may be illustrated by several instances. Not only the men of the Yōmei school but of the Shu-shi school also laid so much emphasis on mental training that they can hardly be understood without paying full attention to what they termed "*kufū*" (Chin., *kung-fū*), "method of drill," or "*sonyō*" (Chin., *ts'un-yang*), "the preservation and perpetuation (of the primeval vitality)." Our author in treating the ethics of a Shushist (p. 82)

simply omits his theory of the "*sonyō*," which is found in Inouye's *Shushi Gakuha* (pp. 254-259), and jumps at once, between lines 8 and 9, from the theory of benevolence to that of death. In fact, page 82 of the book is a reproduction of pp. 253-261 of Inouye's original, except the omission above mentioned. Now this omission may be attributed to the author's judgment, but the grave defect of thereby missing a very important point cannot be overlooked. This is an illustration of the fact that the author fails to see in the psychology of later Confucianists a vital link connecting their metaphysics and ethics.

This brings me to a more serious remark; viz., that the author has thereby fallen into a point of view almost contrary to the purpose of his studies. The reader is told that the work was undertaken with the aim of understanding the Japanese, and the author's sympathetic attitude is to be appreciated. In spite of this, he says in his conclusion (p. 295): "The moral ideal of Confucianism is good, so far as the letter of it is concerned. It is an excellent moral code in ink. Its weakness lies in its spirit. . . . They [moral systems of similar types] fail to inspire and to give life." Thus the author has seen metaphysical theories and moral codes, but has failed to see how those Confucianists cultivated their psychological theories not only in thought but in life, in "*kufū*," the vitalizing principle and method of Confucian ethics. What the author accuses Confucianism of is rather a defect of his own observation than of Confucian ethics.

The author's criticism of Confucian ethics is that it lacks inspiring power. There is a question which he should have put to himself before coming to this conclusion, even apart from the consideration of self-culture practised by Confucians. The question which will arise in the mind of every careful reader is this: Were all these teachers mere teachers of letters, or did they exercise any amount of actual influence on the moral life of the times? The author tells us much of the lives and theories of these teachers, and has added to Inouye's originals three chapters of general remarks on the nature of these schools. But the reader is left almost entirely without information as to what these thinkers had to do with the people or with the training of the Samurai class. Of course, the author mentions, for instance, that Kaibara wrote his works in popular style, or that Tōju influenced his villagers very deeply; but unfortunately his interests are directed chiefly to the theories and sayings of these teachers, and little is said of their educative methods and their concern with moral training. And yet the author's conclusion is

that Confucian ethics is merely a moral code in ink! In any case, the "Light from the East," as presented by the author, seems to be a reflection of a light, and not the light itself. Had not the light some warmth and life? The reader will not be satisfied with the author's summary conclusion, but will demand an answer to the question.

Omitting various other points in the author's treatment of the subject that might be discussed, let us see some of his renderings of Japanese expressions into English. To begin with single phrases: the author uses various terms for one and the same expression. The most significant is the word for "*shin*" or "*kokoro*," a term used by the followers of Shu-shi in a special sense. The author's renderings are, "mind," "heart," "soul." Had the author any definite intention in using these synonyms? "Reverence," "respect," "piety," "modesty"—these stand for "*kei*." "Living reason," "the principle of production," "the principle of life," "living principle," "the principles (of heaven and earth)," "the actual (!) law"—these are used for one and the same word, "*seiri*," on pages 80–81 and 93–94 alone. Synonyms are useful for the sake of rhetoric, but it is rather puzzling to render a definite philosophical term by such a variety within so narrow a limit of space.

Some of the quotations are abbreviated too much or in a way not clear. On page 89 it is said: "They [the scholars of the classical school] uphold the way but reject reason." This is hardly intelligible, unless some explanation were added or a reference made to the point treated on pages 228–229. On page 50 the author, in speaking about a difference between Razan, who thought somewhat like Yōmei, and Fujiwara Seika, says: "Yōmei emphasized intuitive knowledge, . . . and hoped . . . to reach the intuitive knowledge by which he hoped to reach the 'Holy Place.' Fujiwara thinks the word 'Seiki' differs from the one used by Shu-shi, meaning original reason (*Kyū-Ri*), but that the thought is the same." This is a repetition of a passage quoted on page 41 (Inouye's original, page 28) and it will be very hard to grasp the meaning without reference to that passage or without an explanation. Let me add an explanation. The point is this: Yōmei aimed at realizing man's original nature by intuitive knowledge or spiritual introspection; and he deemed this attainment to be the realization of the "*sei-iki*," which meant "to be within the threshold of the sage's ideal perfection." Now Fujiwara Seika thought that this ideal aim of Yōmei differed but in name from Shu-shi's ideal perfection. The latter taught that the perfection was attainable by "*kyū-ri*," i.e. in "exhausting the source



of the universal reason," which is the original nature of mankind. I wonder whether the meaning is conveyed in the author's quotation. To take another, lighter one: on page 51 there is a quotation from Razan: "Man is originally a moving animal; how can he resemble a dead body?" This translation is quite right, but would it not be more intelligible to say, for instance: "Man is endowed with life, this is his original nature; how can he behave like a dead body (as recommended by Taoism)?"

The author discusses some points of Confucian ethics and its difference from Buddhism, but I confess that many of these discussions are quite beyond my grasp. Take, for instance, what he has to say on Jinsai's theories of the way and virtues on pages 231-234, which are identical in outlines with pages 233-244 of Inouye's *Shushi Gakuha*. The author quotes Inouye's interpretation of Jinsai as if it were Jinsai's own words (p. 231, lines 10-33), and uses the same word, "nature," for that by which Jinsai meant metaphysical essence and which he opposed, and for what Inouye employed in the usual sense of the word. Even apart from a confusion of this kind, the whole discussion is rather confusing than elucidating. The point seems to me not so complicated as the author makes it, but to amount to the difference between a metaphysical interpretation of the moral nature of man and an ethico-psychological view of moral virtues.

Let me add another passage on what the author calls Oriental pantheism. Since I am at a loss to grasp the meaning, I simply quote the passage (p. 126). It reads: "Yōmei's system, like most pantheistic systems, does not logically provide for evil. In so far as he makes evil separate from the original form, his system ends in a dualism, although he would not admit it. . . . This is the case with all Eastern pantheism. It is not true pantheism, since it ends in a dualism (?). So Western theism, whether of the Jew or of the Greek, is not true monotheism, since it ends in dualism—God *versus* the Universe. These two points of view are complementary. The East needs the West; the West needs the East. There can be no real pantheism which makes individuality an illusion. If so, we should be explaining the pantheism by the illusion. True pantheism is true monotheism. It provides for personality and individual responsibility."

The author devotes an appendix to Buddhism. Instead of taking up various points therein brought out, which are very disputable, I shall only quote his remarks on the conception of the Dharma-kāya of Buddha (p. 318). He says: "In process of time, through the

influence of the Upanishads, and especially through the Yoga philosophy, this revered law became practically identified with the impersonal deity of Brahminism." I wish that the author would one day present the evidence for this bold assertion.

Lastly, in minor details the author leaves on me an impression that he left his manuscripts for publication in the hands of those who had no knowledge of the subject. Many names are spelled wrongly; in some cases Chinese names are written separating the family and the personal names, and in others united; one and the same book is cited under different names, such as "a classic on history" and "Shosho" for the same Shū-king; I-king is cited as "a classic on Philosophy"; the mythological portion of the *Chronicles of Japan* is cited as "a book written in ancient times"; the "Gozan," the "Five Great Monasteries," is cited as if it were one temple, etc. There are some startling novelties; for example, that "Japan had conquered the Loo-Choo Islands [in the sixth century!]" (p. 17); "Fujiwara Takechimaro became professor of the university in 704" (p. 19); "the word heaven [in Chinese] is a development from the original teaching about God" (p. 36); "the influence of Buddhism on this teaching becomes very clear if we substitute the 'world of illusion' for 'Ki,' and the word 'spiritual body of Buddha or law' for 'Ri'" (p. 38); "in the beginning of the ninth century, after the Chinese had driven out their enemies, there was a very strong patriotic feeling" (p. 301).

In conclusion, the painstaking labor of the author must be highly respected. But a little more care would have made the book a really valuable contribution to the world. Especially to be desired are perspective and coherence in general and careful investigation of historical data in detail. The volume is of a kind to which good indexes are indispensable; the index (pp. 325-326) is useless.

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THE PLACE OF THE CHURCH IN EVOLUTION. JOHN MASON TYLER. The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1914. Pp. xiv, 202. \$1.10.

Professor Tyler offers some wise and generous reflections, chiefly applicable to laymen, but serviceable to the ministry as well. He presents a clear and hopeful outline of evolutionary processes which lead up to personality as the "clearest and fullest expression of the power behind and in civilization." The church is the body through which the divine life is to express itself by degrees more completely,